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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the politics and finance of development among
Middle Eastern countries with particular emphasis on the incentives of
autocrats to advance pro-growth policies in general and to foster small
enterprise in particular. It is premised on the observation that there is no
fundamental reason why Middle Eastern economies cannot enjoy steady,
stable economic growth. At several points in the past, particularly in the late
1970s, various Middle Eastern economies, including Iraq, enjoyed middle-
income status. From the 1960s until the end of the 1970s, Middle Eastern
countries made massive public investments in economic infrastructure, as well
as in health, education and, less successfully, in state-owned enterprises.
Economic growth, at six percent per worker per year, was the highest in the
world in the 1960s.' Going back much further, during the tenth century the
Middle East was extremely advanced as measured by its standard of living,
technology, agricultural output, and literacy rates.
2
The discussion begins with a description of the institutional features that
are important to economic development. Three institutional arrangements in
particular are critical for economic growth and human flourishing. These are:
(1) the ability to create investment vehicles that facilitate risk-taking, such as
the corporation and the limited partnership; (2) the capacity of institutions to
adapt to economic and technological advances and changing human
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preferences and tastes; and (3) an economic, social, and legal environment
that encourages long-term investment, tolerates failure, and facilitates trade.
Capacity for risk-bearing is the hallmark of entrepreneurship and the key
to economic growth. While economists have placed considerable emphasis
recently on "external finance," 3 we believe external finance is a second-order
condition that is neither a necessary nor a sufficient catalyst for significant
economic development. Rather, the true precondition for economic growth is
legal and societal tolerance of failure. Because the probability of failure is
high for entrepreneurs starting a new business, the costs associated with such
failure must be reduced as much as possible. One such cost, of course, is
personal liability, and the corporate form is highly effective at reducing this
direct cost. But an as-yet unrecognized benefit of limited liability is that it also
sends a signal to entrepreneurs that failure is acceptable as a matter of social
policy and societal norms. In other words, when society grants an
entrepreneur status as a limited liability entity, it is removing or, at a
minimum, reducing the social stigma associated with failure.4
The benefits of the limited liability form of corporate organization have,
in our view, been significantly misstated because previous analyses have
failed to take into account the norm-creating implications of such rules. Where
the state encourages the formation of business in the corporate form, it is
sending a powerful green light to entrepreneurs, telling them that it is
permissible not only to start a new firm, but also to fail in its creation. The
failure of a firm organized as a sole proprietorship or a partnership lies with
the sole proprietor or with the partners; the failure of a firm organized as a
corporation or a limited liability partnership, however, lies with the entity.
This transfer reduces the social stigma of failure not only on the entrepreneur,
but also on his family and on his investors.
In our view, the value of limited liability lies in its signaling function for
entrepreneurs: sending the message that failure, while not desirable, should
not be viewed as a reflection on the personal character or honesty of the
entrepreneur. This signal, in turn, leads to a dramatic increase in the supply of
entrepreneurs within an economy. The value of the corporate form in enabling
private entrepreneurs to escape individual liability for failure has been
overstated, particularly for small businesses. Since lenders typically require
such entrepreneurs to sign personal guarantees in order to receive credit, the
narrow economic value of limited liability is not great-entrepreneurs
generally must risk their personal assets when they start a new business.
People have to be willing to take risks in order for an economy to grow.
Where these risks include the high likelihood of shame, the inability to start
another business, stigmatizing effects on oneself and one's family, possible
personal criminal liability for defrauding creditors, and personal liability for
3. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1977).
4. In the United States, some scholars and policymakers bemoan the reduction in stigma
associated with declaring bankruptcy. See S. REP. No. 106-49, at 2, 3 (1999) and articles cited therein.
But the level of stigmatization can also be inefficiently high if it chills socially valuable
entrepreneurship and risk-taking.
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an unincorporated firm's debts, the supply of entrepreneurs is likely to be
small.
When the state makes access to the limited liability form easy and
inexpensive, it signals that it is encouraging risk-taking. The regulation of
limited liability may more broadly signal other aspects of a state's regulatory
attitude toward business formation. Since entrepreneurs starting new
businesses often are asked to sign personal guarantees in order to obtain
credit, insulation from personal liability is only modestly important. Instead, it
is the de-stigmatizing effects of state liberalization of the corporate form that
matter.
It is easy for the state to draft legislation that would facilitate the
formation of limited liability forms of business organization. The World Bank
and other funders want these reforms. 5 Many Middle Eastern countries,
however, have steadfastly resisted efforts at substantive reform and still place
substantial roadblocks in the path of small-business creation. This paper
considers the causes of this resistance. It uses economic theories of politics,
particularly public choice and social choice theory, to show that, under certain
conditions prevalent in Middle Eastern politics, it would be irrational for the
ruling coalitions to encourage small-business entrepreneurship. These theories
demonstrate that increasing the number of small businesses would lead to a
rise in the middle class, which in turn would create destabilizing pressures for
democratic reforms. In addition, new business would bring increased
competition to the existing firms that, by definition, provide political support
to the incumbent ruling class.
Finally, this paper argues that simplifying the process of forming new
businesses will require depoliticization of the process. Depoliticization, in
turn, will lead to a diminution in the demand for the services of incumbent
government bureaucrats, thereby resulting in a reduction in the ability of the
incumbent ruling coalition to extract rents from citizens.
The analysis herein will also consider, and reject, the rationales for
underdevelopment in the Middle East contained in what currently passes for
conventional wisdom. It has been asserted that underdevelopment in the
Middle East is attributable to the obsolescent nature of certain Middle Eastern
institutions, particularly: (1) the Islamic law of inheritance, which is said to
have inhibited capital accumulation; (2) the strict individualism of Islamic
law, which is said to have prevented the rise of the corporate form; and (3) the
waqf, Islam's trust vehicle, which, it has been argued, has locked wealth into
inefficient institutional arrangements that cannot evolve over time. 6 It is
wrong, in our view, to blame the lack of development in the Middle East on
these institutional characteristics.
Significantly, each of these institutions was, in all likelihood, efficient
when it was first introduced. In fact, all of these arrangements could easily be
cited as reasons for economic growth and development, rather than as reasons
for economic stagnation, had history turned out differently. Thus, they are not
5. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the World Bank Report).
6. Timur Kuran, Why the Islamic Middle East Did Not Generate an Indigenous Corporate
Law I (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C04-16), at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?-
abstractid=585687 (Feb. 9, 2005); Kuran, supra note 2, at 71-72.
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the cause of the region's lack of development. Instead, the lack of
development in the Middle East is attributable to an absence of incentives to
implement economic liberalization, not to religious or cultural impediments to
development.
To be sure, path dependence is a problem. Inefficient institutions, once
they come into existence, tend to remain unchanged even in the face of
changing circumstances. The apparent incapacity of Middle Eastern economic
and social institutions to evolve in the face of changing circumstances, a
phenomenon that has led to the lack of economic development, has been
compounded by the lack of diversity and choice among rival institutional
arrangements. The centralization and ossification of historical institutional
arrangements create obstacles to economic development in the Middle East.
But the real problem is not path dependence; it is the lack of political
incentives for reform. This paper argues that incumbent ruling elites rationally
oppose economic development when such development is likely to lead to
social changes that threaten their hold on power. It is this rational
calculation-not culture, history, or religion-that sustains obstacles to
growth in the Middle East.
These problems are surprising considering the relative clarity and
simplicity of Islamic business law. Relative to Christian or Jewish law, the
Quran has few economic rules, and there has not been the explosion of rival
interpretations that has occurred elsewhere. The problem in the Islamic world
has been a lack of dynamism: legal rules and institutions, once in place, tend
to remain static. In a rapidly changing world, this lack of legal development
has prevented the emergence of modem, efficient institutional arrangements
for financial intermediation and investment. Adding to the problem is distrust
and intense dislike of America, which, among other things, is a symbol of
economic freedom and laissez-faire economic policies. This anti-Americanism
prevents reform because market liberalization is branded as western cultural
imperialism.
II. DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH
The explosion of research in development economics, particularly by
economists whose specialty is microeconomics and the theory of the firm
rather than macroeconomics and interest-rate policy, has yielded a dizzying
farrago of theories about the necessary preconditions for economic growth.
Among the common characteristics of successful economies are heavy capital
investment, extensive schooling, relatively low income inequality, low
fertility, temperate climate, good seaports, laissez-faire government policies,
well-developed capital markets, political and economic freedoms, strong
property rights, ethnic homogeneity, British colonial origins, common-law
legal systems, political stability, good governance, foreign direct investment,
and suitably conditioned foreign aid.
7. Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999);
Romain Wacziarg, Review of Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 907 (2002).
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As interesting as these various theories are, a causation problem exists: it
is not clear whether such elements as good schools cause economic
development, or whether economic development enables and therefore causes
certain societies to be able to afford good schools, as well as produce other
results, such as political stability and low income inequality.
Another vexing problem with most extant theories of growth and
development is that under such theories, the most important determinants of
growth appear to be historical, institutional features that are the result of long-
standing, highly path-dependent factors that are not susceptible to change or
improvement. In other words, under most theories of growth, weak patterns of
development are the economic equivalent of a genetic malformation for which
there is no known cure or therapy.8 But history, as opposed to economic
theory, shows that over time countries do, in fact, experience periods of rapid
growth that often are preceded (or followed) by periods of economic
stagnation.
A third problem with the dominant theories of growth, particularly as
exemplified by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV),9 is
the exclusive focus on public companies in an examination of whether
common law or civil law systems better protect minority shareholders and
provide adequate incentives for the accumulation of external capital. This
approach pays insufficient attention to the determinants of business formation.
By looking solely at external finance, the LLSV approach misses the fact that
businesses must already be successful before they can even need external
finance, much less succeed in attracting it. Many new companies fail. The
critical determinant of growth therefore, in our estimation, is not whether an
economic system provides sufficient access to external finance, but whether
the system provides sufficient incentives for the formation of new business. If
so, then even in the absence of external finance, firms can grow by financing
themselves through retained earnings. Thus, countries such as France and
Italy, civil law states with weak protections for minority shareholders and
inefficient banking systems, have been able to achieve and sustain admirable
rates of economic growth because they provide adequate incentives for the
formation of small business.' 0 Theories of economic growth must consider
that the formation of new business may well be even more important to
economic growth than the ability of existing, successful business to obtain
external financing from banks or capital markets.
Finally, theories such as that espoused by LLSV-which establishes that
external finance is more difficult and protections for minority shareholders are
weaker in countries with civil law origins-falter for two reasons when
addressing minimum capital requirements and bureaucratic hurdles to
business formation. First, the LLSV theory does not address why the legal
rules in the progeny of civil law systems are stricter than those in France and
8. See, e.g., Valerie Bockstette et al., States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start, 7
J. ECON. GROWTH 347 (2002).
9. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 3; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
10. Amoud Boot & Jonathan Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of
Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 356 (2004).
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Germany, the countries where the rules originated. In other words, why are
the minimum capital and bureaucratic hurdles worse in the Muslim world than
they are in France and Germany? Interest group politics explains this
phenomenon far better than the LLSV path dependence story.
Second, LLSV argue that civil law systems provide inadequate
protections for minority shareholders and creditors. Yet according to public
interest theory, minimum capital requirements exist ostensibly to provide
protection for minority shareholders and creditors. That these protections are
stricter in civil law countries is inconsistent with LLSV's hypothesis. In other
words, existing theories of growth in finance focus too heavily, in our view,
on the supply side of the growth equation. Such scholarship examines the
connections between the operation of various financial systems and economic
growth, concluding that "the preponderance of the evidence suggests that both
financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth.""1 As Merton Miller
has asserted, "that financial markets contribute to economic growth is a
proposition almost too obvious for serious discussion."' 2 This may be the
case, but before financial markets can supply firms with capital, the firms
demanding such capital must come into existence in the first place. Along the
same lines, it also seems clear that the demand for capital by firms will
determine, or, at a minimum, will influence the shape of the financial markets.
As Joan Robinson famously articulated the point in 1952, "where enterprise
leads finance follows."
13
The problem with these rival theories about the determinants of
economic growth is that they both presuppose the existence of the engines of
growth. The key question for these theories is whether the crucial inputs for
growth are available. According to the finance theory, banks, stock markets,
and other institutions of financial intermediation provide the funding and
technical guidance necessary for economic development to occur. By contrast,
the rival theory posits that the financial sector develops in response to demand
for financial services from industry. The difference between these theories is
the perennial "chicken and egg" problem. It seems clear that both sides are
correct: economies with flourishing industrial sectors are likely to have
flourishing financial sectors, and vice versa. The enduring problem is to
specify a theory of growth that can provide insights of value to those studying
economies that have neither well-developed financial sectors nor well-
developed industrial sectors.
Similarly, none of the existing theories of growth and development, in or
out of finance, accounts for why countries exhibit such differences in levels of
investment in human capital. Likewise, path dependence appears to provide
the only account of why some economies enjoy high levels of trust and
socially beneficial norms and institutions, while others appear to be lacking in
11. Ross Levine, Finance and Growth Theory and Evidence 85 (NBER Working Paper No.
10766), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766 (Sept. 2004).
12. Merton H. Miller, Financial Markets and Economic Growth, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8,
25 (1998).
13. JOAN ROBINSON, The Generalization of the General Theory, in THE RATE OF INTEREST
AND OTHER ESSAYS 67, 86 (1952); see also Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic
Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3 (1988).
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such norms and in the element of trust that provides the basis for economic
development. Here all agree that education and other forms of human capital
investment are important determinants of growth, but a better understanding is
needed of how to jump-start this process.
The gaps in the existing theory follow from its failure to account for the
critical preconditions to economic growth. This paper posits that growth starts
with demand by individual entrepreneurs for small-business creation. Many of
these small businesses inevitably fail, but some succeed-and those that do
provide the demand side for finance as well as the basic engines of growth for
the rest of the economy. The difference between developing countries and
countries with poor records of growth and development lies in the incentives
provided by government and other societal institutions to start new businesses.
Small businesses are the main engine for growth even in countries with
better-developed economies. In the United States, for example, small
businesses create approximately 75% of the new jobs added to the economy,
represent 99% of all employers, employ 50% of the private work force,
account for 41% of private sales in the country, and provide 39% of jobs in
high technology sectors and over one-half of private sector output.
14
Small businesses are likely to play an even more important role in the
private sector of less-developed countries in which weak securities markets
and banking sectors make it difficult to accumulate the large amounts of
capital needed to fund big business. Of course, whether the future of an
economy depends on large, medium, or small-size firms, all firms start small;
unless there are sufficient incentives to start a small business, the economy
generally will suffer.
Thus, under our theory, simple factors, notably the ease of starting a new
business and the ability to operate that business without fear of personal
liability or imprisonment, are critical variables in the solution to the growth
puzzle. In particular, the inability of small entrepreneurs to start and maintain
small businesses seems to explain the economic pathology in many
developing countries, particularly in the Middle East. The core problems are:
(1) the lack of easy access to the limited liability organizational form that
provides a vehicle for doing business without fear of crushing personal
liability; and (2) the lack of choice among a variety of such forms. Limited
liability forms of business organization not only facilitate risk-taking but also
stimulate the demand for capital, thereby promoting the development of the
financial sector.
Economic growth requires entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship requires
risk-taking. Different legal frameworks provide different incentives for risk-
taking. In the United States, for example, the ease with which firms and
individuals can declare bankruptcy and, perhaps more importantly, the lack of
social stigma associated with such declarations remove disincentives for firms
and individuals to take risks. In countries where debtors face potential civil or
criminal liability for business failure or inability to pay creditors, those
14. U.S. Small Bus. Ass'n, Small Business Statistics, at http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/-
sbastats.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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prospects dampen risk-taking incentives.' 5 Clearly, the ability to form limited
liability entities such as the corporation, the joint stock company, and the
limited partnership is critical to attract risk capital.
In other words, flexibility in the creation of corporate forms and
structures is important not only in attracting outside investment capital to
business but also in providing entrepreneurs with sufficient incentives to start
new business enterprises. Middle Eastern countries are among the most
difficult places in the world in which to start a business. The difficulty is not
religious in character; it is political and bureaucratic. It takes too long to start
a business, few alternative business forms are available, and far too many
bureaucratic hurdles lie along the road to business formation, particularly in
the form of minimum capital requirements.
Risk-taking by small-business owners, individual investors, and high
net-worth individuals is the critical element that produces high growth rates.
In the United States, the traditional corporate form is being challenged by a
new limited liability form of business organization, the limited liability
company (LLC). This organizational structure combines all the tax benefits
associated with partnerships (taxation on profit distributions only at the
investor level, not at the entity level) with the limited liability protections of
the traditional corporate form. This corporate form, now legal in forty-eight
U.S. states, is considerably cheaper, simpler, and easier to maintain than
alternative organizational forms, including Subchapter S corporations and
limited family partnerships. LLCs can own subsidiary companies and can
have an unlimited number of investors, and they also enjoy greater flexibility
in allocating profits. LLCs are even better than limited partnerships in terms
of protecting investors' and entrepreneurs' personal assets.
Moreover, the ready availability of the traditional corporate form, the
LLC, and the limited partnership is an essential prerequisite to the
development of a successful venture capital market. 16 In this context, it is
important to stress that venture capital investment is, by definition, investment
in unlisted, early-stage, or start-up companies, with the objective of profiting
by either selling the company or taking it public approximately five years after
the initial investment.
Venture capital investment requires an array of organizational forms.
Outside investors typically are limited partners, so they need a vehicle such as
the limited partnership. The venture partnership itself generally purchases
preferred shares in a closely held corporation that it hopes to take public in the
future. The virtue of the limited partnership form of business organization,
which has been adopted in all countries with successful venture capital
sectors, is that it permits investors to enjoy limited liability while conveying
unrealized investment gains and losses to the investors without tax being paid
at the enterprise level. In other words, the limited partnership is not a taxable
entity, although it is a limited liability entity. Gains and losses pass through
the enterprise to investors for tax purposes. Tort and contract liability,
15. Luca Enriques & Jonathan Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against
the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1165, 1201 (2001).
16. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 252 (1998).
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however, remain with the enterprise. Firms may not always choose the most
efficient, cost-effective organizational form, but they should at least be given
the flexibility to do so.
17
Governance of the limited partnership is carried out by the general
partner of the enterprise. In the venture capital context, as in other arenas, the
general partner of the limited partnership generally is organized either as a
corporation or as a limited liability company. The firms in which the venture
capital fund invests are organized as corporations, with the fund typically
taking preferred shares that are convertible into common shares and that give
the venture capitalist the right to a controlling (majority) number of seats on
the company's board of directors.
In a recent and important article, Timur Kuran has asserted that Islamic
law "provides no room for corporations-collective enterprises possessing
legal rights distinct from those of the individuals who finance or serve
[them]."' 8 The problem with this observation is that Jewish and Christian law
make no specific provisions for such collective enterprises either. As with
other cultures, early Middle Eastern economies had partnerships that
permitted collective investment and that were deemed consistent with Islamic
Law.19 The question is why Islamic law did not evolve more quickly to permit
the emergence of corporations and other juridical entities that have the legal
capacity to assume risk and enter contracts. It was not until 1851 that the first
predominantly Muslim-owned joint stock company, the $irket-I Hayriye
marine transportation company, was formed.2° While the corporate form is
available in the Middle East, forming a corporation takes longer, is more
expensive, and involves substantially more interactions with government
bureaucracy than elsewhere in the world. Clearly, this long-standing lack of
an institutional structure such as the corporate form has historically been a
significant impediment to capital formation in Middle Eastern countries.
This observation, then, leads to the question of why the economic
institutions in Middle Eastern economies so frequently appear to lack the
capacity to evolve over time in order to adapt to new economic and
technological circumstances and to changing human preferences.
A. The Role of the State
Central planning has never been successful at allocating capital
efficiently. The persistent failure of even the best-intentioned government
efforts to make effective capital allocation decisions has proven, to the extent
such assertions ever can be proven, that economies in which the private sector
17. Joe Bankman has shown that Silicon Valley start-up companies do not always choose the
most efficient form from among the plethora of choices available to them. Bankman argues that start-up
companies often could have reduced their net tax liability if they had organized as subsidiary
corporations or limited partnerships rather than as independent corporations. But many start-ups chose to
organize as independent corporations, causing most firms to lose millions in potential tax savings. This
assertion may be true; our point is simply that such optimization is possible only when there is a menu
of choices. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994).
18. Kuran, supra note 2, at 73.
19. ABRAHAM L. UDOVITCH, PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 249-61 (1970).
20. Kuran, supra note 6, at 1.
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dominates capital allocation decisions are likely to outperform those in which
government takes the leading role in making decisions about how to invest
resources. This conclusion, however, emphatically does not mean that the
government has no role to play in the economy, particularly in reducing
transaction costs, providing standard form, off-the-rack rules, and dealing with
distributional unfairness.2'
So far, this paper has stressed that government is necessary to provide
the legal framework for entrepreneurship. The legal system provides the
business forms that permit the creation of the business entities through which
investment is made. The basic corporate entity in particular, conceptualized as
a contracting entity separate and distinct from its investors, is essential not
only to attract investors but also to provide entrepreneurs with the incentives
they need to take the risks inherently involved in starting a new business.
This observation implies that the state is required to do far more than merely
create a contracting framework within the context of the classical libertarian
"night watchman state." 22 Nozick, by contrast, articulated the ideal role of the
state in the following terms:
a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud,
enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified;... any more extensive state will violate
persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and . . . the
minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the state
may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others,
or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.
23
Nozick's definition of the role of the state leaves no room for corporations or
other limited liability forms of business organizations. In establishing the
framework for the corporate form, the state necessarily uses its coercive
apparatus in order to get some citizens to aid others: when the state permits
the corporate form, as it ubiquitously does, its coercive power prohibits non-
contracting third parties who deal with the corporation, particularly tort
claimants, from obtaining compensation from the firm's investors, including
shareholders and other putative owners, for damages caused by the firm. The
state coerces these third parties unwittingly to aid others, namely the
corporation's investors, in a clear violation of Nozick's strictures.
The corporate form, in other words, involves a disturbing societal
decision to force some individuals at least potentially to sacrifice their own
interests for the greater social good. This result clearly resists Nozick's moral
claim that "there is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others.,
24
21. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989).
22. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 25, 26-27 (1974).
23. Id. at ix. Other prominent proponents of the minimal state include Benjamin Constant,
Herbert Spencer, Leonard Read, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, James M. Buchanan, Milton
Friedman, Ayn Rand, John Hospers, and Henry David Thoreau.
24. Id. at 33. The corporate form could be made to comply with Nozick's ideal if limited
liability were waived with regard to non-consenting tort creditors. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1881
(1991). This interesting academic proposal has certainly not been widely adopted. See, e.g., Mark
Weinstein, Share Price Changes and the Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2003).
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For development, the state must provide at least three functions: (1) it
must create a legal environment in which contracts can be freely made and
enforced; (2) it must create and freely permit the use of the various forms of
business organization that serve as the vehicles for investing; and (3) it must
pass laws that permit these business organizations to have distinct legal
personalities. Endowing a business with legal personality in turn enables all
investors, including residual claimants, to invest without fear of personal
liability to non-contracting third parties for the debts and obligations of the
business.
Providing the necessary institutional features for growth is not at all
technically difficult, particularly since these features can be copied readily
from existing common law and civil law economies. The challenge, rather, is
political. Permitting corporations and other business organizations to be
formed freely requires the state and particular bureaucracies within it to
relinquish some of their powers. Reducing the number of interactions with the
state bureaucracy required to form a corporation and reducing (or, better still,
eliminating) the costs of forming a corporation involve something far more
difficult: the voluntary sacrifice of power by the state.
Most importantly, a foreseeable consequence of making access to the
corporate form cheap and plentiful is the rise of a large cohort of small
businesses, and the corresponding emergence of a middle class of small-
business owners and entrepreneurs. Turning specifically to the Middle East, a
U.S. State Department official made this point in an interview prior to a
summit meeting among G8 foreign and finance ministers and their Arab
counterparts in Rabat, Morocco, intended to promote democracy across the
Arab world. He observed that technical and financial assistance that facilitates
the formation of small-business enterprises in the Middle East will contribute
to democratic change in that region: "when you help small entrepreneurs, that
creates a middle-class [which is] part of the social underpinning of
democracy .... We [the Bush administration] see synergistic links between
political and economic initiatives.
' 25
From this incipient middle class base will come not only advances in per
capita GDP, but also an emergent class of educated citizens interested in all
sorts of reforms that inevitably will be viewed as threatening by the incumbent
ruling cohort. This emergent class might be threatening both as a group and
individually. As a group, the middle class may come to wield both economic
and political power. While the first generation of middle class entrepreneurs
may not be individually threatening, their children may turn their ambitions to
bigger things-such as politics. What seems to be lost on U.S. administration
officials is any recognition that the ruling coalitions in these countries may not
welcome economic initiatives that lead to political initiatives, particularly
those aimed at democratization: such reform necessarily will threaten their
jobs, status, and power.
25. Joel Brinkley, US. Slows Bid to Advance Democracy in Arab World, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5,
2004, at Al (quoting Alan P. Larson, Under Secretary of State for economic, business and agricultural
affairs); see also Arnir Taheri, Sowing Seeds of Democracy Is Bush's Victory in "War on Terror," GULF
NEWS, at http://www.benadorassociates.com/pf.php?id--9299 (Nov. 17, 2004).
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The threat that an emergent entrepreneurial class poses to non-
democratic institutions is clear. Entrepreneurs will educate their children and
this process will, in turn, lead to pressure for social reform. As Ronald
Inglehart has observed, two types of social change-rising education levels
and rising occupational specialization-produce a citizenry that is more
articulate, better-equipped to organize and communicate, more autonomous,
more accustomed to thinking for themselves, and more endowed with
specialized skills that enhance their bargaining power with elites.26
In other words, it is political (and not economic or technical) factors that
conspire to impede relaxation of constraints on corporate formation.
Economic reform will lead to the emergence of a middle class of small-
business owners who will, in turn, provide broad-based and powerful support
for democratization. By making it difficult to start small businesses, the ruling
coalition can dampen the demand for political reform by stymieing the
development of the economic cohort that will be the source of such demand.
Our theory can be viewed as a practical, political implication of Robert
Putnam's argument about social capital. Putnam shows that democracy
depends on social capital, which in turn is created by the civic and economic
institutions that occupy the cultural and political space outside of the family
and the state.27 If this assertion is true, then it stands to reason that rational
despots will take steps to retard the development of "trust, norms, and
networks ' 28 that create social capital and provide the necessary components
for democratic governments. One way to implement this strategy is to make
business formation more difficult. People involved in business further their
interests by networking, which in turn creates social capital and, subsequently,
pressure for democratization. This process and its outcomes are quite
threatening to despots.
B. The Middle East
Timur Kuran has argued that:
if community building was indeed central to Islam's initial mission, the early promoters
of Islam would have been suspicious of any concept liable to facilitate factionalism. In
particular, the fear of stoking the embers of tribalism, or stimulating similarly exclusive
forms of solidarity, would have made them spurn the idea of a corporation.
29
This assertion is doubtful. There is substantial evidence to the contrary,
particularly the relatively enlightened position of Islam with respect to trade
and commercialism and the absence of the sort of anti-market sentiment that
characterizes important strands of Christian thought.3° Consider, for example,
26. RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION 163 (1997).
27. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
167-71 (1993).
28. Id. at 170.
29. Kuran, Why supra note 6, at 21.
30. The first corporation in the world was likely organized at the Catacombs of Kom el
Shoqafafirst, which originally appears to have been developed to serve the funereal needs of a single
family, but was expanded in the early second century into a burial site for the masses, administered by a
corporation. Members paid dues for the right to have family members buried in one of the many rock-
hewn chambers at the site. It is worth noting that, unlike Christianity, Islam has never been hostile to the
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that the Christian notion that it is harder for a rich man to get to heaven than
for a camel to transverse the eye of a needle 31 is not found in Islam.
Moreover, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, it seems
unlikely that such a precise prohibition as the one on corporations and other
separate juridical entities could have arisen from so broad and universal a
concept as the promotion of inclusive communities. As Kuran has observed,
"[flaced with the question of whether it is legitimate to bequeath property to a
mosque, which is not a natural person, certain early jurists had ruled in the
affirmative." 32 After all, many who promote inclusive communities find
nothing inconsistent with the concept of juridical entities such as the
corporation. Moreover,
[firom the dawn of Islam, every generation of Muslims faced situations that made it
convenient to grant or utilize a group identity less inclusive than that of the community of
all Muslims. The exigencies of daily life thus exposed the impracticability of keeping the
ever-expanding global Muslim community undivided and undifferentiated.
33
For example, guilds were organized along monopsonistic trade lines, such that
buyers of goods such as flour and butter were given exclusive rights to
purchase these particular goods from foreign suppliers.34 These organizations
were treated as juridical entities separate from their constituents. What was
lacking in these entities-and in other, even more important entities
recognized under Islamic law such as the waqf-was limited liability. Limited
liability, in turn, requires an organizational structure that endows a firm with
legal personhood, separate and distinct from its owners, that can enter into
contracts, sue and be sued, and otherwise incur liability. It seems clear,
however, that
[w]ith a modicum of imagination a person steeped in Islamic legal history could have
found Islamic precedents showing that the Islamic legal tradition already harbored a
concept of personhood. Indeed, numerous historical episodes, some from the revered
seventh century, could have been used to justify endowing associations with fictitious
personhood.
35
While it is implausible to blame Islam, as Timur Kuran has done, for the
failure of Middle Eastern countries to adopt contemporary, flexible forms of
business organization, it is even more implausible to blame Islam for the
failure of Middle Eastern countries to simplify and reduce the bureaucracy
required to start a business, hire and fire workers, enforce contracts, obtain
credit, or close a business and collect debts. There are no Middle Eastern
private sector or to rational, enlightened, self-interested behavior among merchants. Indeed, the Prophet
himself was from a well-to-do family of the Qoreish tribes in Mecca. The chief occupation of his tribe
was trade, and he traveled on business with his uncle, at one point meeting the Christian monk Behara
during a commercial venture to Syria. See The Catacombs of Kom el Shoqafa, at
http://wonderclub.com/WorldWonders/-CatacombsHistory.html (Aug. 30, 2000).
31. See Matthew 19:24.
32. Kuran, supra note 6, at 26.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 20-26 (observing that "the fourth caliph Ali (d. 661) is reputed to have said that the
furnishings of the Kaba, Islam's most sacred sanctuary, are owned by the Kaba itself. Such precedents
could have served as justification for granting legal recognition to an entity other than a natural
person").
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countries among the top twenty economies in the world as measured by the
ease of doing business, despite the presence of developing economies such as
Botswana and Thailand on the list.p6 Ease of doing business is a vector along
which global economies can and do compete. In 2003 and 2004, for example,
fully half the countries in the European Union reduced the time required for
starting and operating a business. Poorer countries, defined by the World
Bank Group income classifications, tended to resist reform.
38
A more likely explanation for the continued bureaucratic hurdles to
doing business is the interest of elites in maintaining their power over capital
allocation. The notion of the corporation as a separate juridical entity poses a
unique political problem for religious elites who provide services that
otherwise might be provided by a more efficient government. If the
corporation can exist as a separate, for-profit entity, then so too can the state.
Private interests matter, and it was never in the private interest of Middle
Eastern countries to recognize the creation of separate juridical entities such
as corporations or limited liability companies. This phenomenon, in turn, has
retarded economic development.
In other words, the greatest strength of the limited liability form is its
ability to accumulate large amounts of wealth and, consequently, to
accumulate large quantities of power. This feature of the corporate form
represents a potential threat to the power of the very authorities that are
necessary for its legitimization. The desire to curb institutional competition, in
our view, provides the most likely explanation for the long-time failure of
Islamic nations to grant legal recognition to non-persons. 39 Even to this day,
Islamic countries tend to have restrictions on the formation of limited liability
companies, particularly restrictions on foreign investment.4°
Of course, competition between the public and private sectors is not in
any way unique to Islamic societies. This phenomenon is ubiquitous in the
modem world. But the wide divergence in resolutions to this tension raises the
question of why the state permitted the formation of limited liability juridical
entities in the non-Islamic world. Here the pluralism of the West, particularly
the simultaneous existence of rival governments and the competition for
authority between religious groups and the state, deprived any particular
authority of the ability to benefit itself by limiting access to the corporate
form. Market participants who wanted the advantages of the corporate form
could engage in forum shopping by searching for a jurisdiction that would
permit this organizational form. In other words, jurisdictional competition
among competing states and religions, much more prevalent in the West than
in the Middle East, explains why the West generated a richer variety of
36. See WORLD BANK, INT'L FIN. CORP. & OxFoRD UNIV. PRESS, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005:
REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH 2 (2005) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN 2005].
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Recall that it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the first corporate
form came to the Middle East, substantially later than it came, for example, to Europe. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
40. See Info-Prod Research (Middle East) Ltd., IPR Country Guide,
http://www.infoprod.co.il/country/index.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (providing links to Middle
Eastern countries that contain descriptions of the business forms and structures in each country).
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corporate forms than the Middle East. For example, when entrepreneurs
discovered that they could incorporate in one U.S. state and do business in
another without having to obtain a special legislative corporate charter, the
demand for such charters disappeared and states shifted to the modem practice
of granting charters as a matter of right. 4' In the absence of this sort of
jurisdictional competitive pressure, it is possible that the United States, like
many Middle Eastern countries, would have developed a much less flexible
and dynamic system of business law.
The critical point here is that corporations and other limited liability
entities have the potential to be both powerfully destabilizing and powerfully
democratizing. Corporations are democratizing in two ways. First, on the
demand side of the equation, the introduction of corporations and other
limited liability entities permits decentralized capital formation. Society can
pursue modernization and industrialization without concentrating decisions
regarding capital formation in the hands of a few families, or in the hands of
the state. While such decentralization leads to efficient investment decisions,
it also facilitates societal power-sharing in ways that other forms of financial
intermediation do not. Perhaps most importantly, when firms can raise the
capital they need in the public capital markets, they no longer have to rely on
the government or on other sources, such as powerful families, for funding.
While this recourse to markets reduces rent-seeking in society significantly, it
also reduces the power of government and of the richest individuals and
families in society.
A similar dynamic comes into play on the supply side of the equation:
the corporate form, with its critical features of limited liability and freely
transferable shares, allows for the creation of a large middle class of investors
in an economy that is able to accumulate large amounts of capital and to put
that capital to productive use. This middle class emergence is what accurately
could be called the democratizing function of the limited liability form of
business organization. In addition to serving the important function of
reducing rent-seeking, the corporate form simultaneously permits firms to
raise capital from many different sources and supports tremendous
heterogeneity among suppliers of capital.
Starting a new business in a Middle Eastern or North African country is
unusually difficult. These countries have some of the largest capital
requirements for start-up businesses anywhere in the world, according to a
recent report on investment climate reforms cosponsored by the World Bank
and its private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC). Consistent with our analysis, this report finds that investment climate
reforms, "while often simple, can help create job opportunities for women and
young people, encourage businesses to move into the formal economy, and
promote economic growth."42 For example, the World Bank observes that
41. Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 129 (1985).
42. Press Release, The World Bank Group, Doing Business 2005: Poor Nations Struggle To
Reduce Red Tape for Business, Miss Large Growth Opportunities, at http://web.worldbank.org/-
WBSrrE/EXTERNANEWSO,,contentMDK:20250634-menuPK:34463-pagePK:64003015-piPK:64
003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html (Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter World Bank Group Press Release]. See
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between 2003 and 2004, Morocco experienced a 21% jump in new business
registrations after simplifying its entry procedures.43 This increase is truly
remarkable given that the minimum capital requirement for limited liability
companies in Morocco was, until recently, prohibitively set at $85,000 (MDH
10,000).44 However, in light of the fact that the minimum capital requirement
in Saudi Arabia is set at $533,000 (SAR 2,000,000) for privately held
companies and $2,666,000 (SAR 10,000,000) for public companies,4 while
for Jordanian firms the minimum capital requirement is over $700,000 (JD
500,000), the price tag for starting a business in Morocco is not completely
surprising.46 In fact, the figure is in line with other Middle Eastern countries
such as Oman, which has a minimum capital requirement for its public
companies (joint stock companies) of $65,000 (RO 25,000). 4 7 By Western
standards, however, the figure is almost unimaginable: U.S. minimum capital
requirements are zero in most states and close to it in others, and effectively
zero in the European Union. 48 It is no coincidence that Arab countries in
which Islam is the dominant religion account for six of the ten countries in the
world with the highest minimum capital requirements for starting a business.
Interestingly, the World Bank and IFC report, which measures the
efficiency of regulation in 145 countries, "finds that poor nations, through
administrative procedures, still make it two times harder than rich nations for
entrepreneurs to start, operate, or close a business, and businesses in poor
nations have less than half the property rights protections available to
generally DoiNG BUSINESS IN 2005, supra note 36. The World Bank report counted the number of steps
it takes to begin operating a commercial or industrial firm legally. The measurement does not include
the days and procedures needed to bring the product to market, but instead counts when the firm may
start operations. Typically, procedures include the time required to register the company formally, as
well as the actions necessary to comply with regulations concerning such things as (1) taxation, (2)
labor, (3) health and safety, (4) the environment, and (5) substantive quality screening (i.e., weeding out
undesirable entrepreneurs). See Int'l Fin. Corp., Starting a Business, at http://rru.worldbank.org/-
DoingBusiness/Methodology/StartingBusiness.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); see also Simeon
Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 7 (2002). The dataset used in the World
Bank report also measures the number of procedures required to "start an industrial or commercial
business." If a country has multiple limited liability forms, the most popular form among small domestic
firms was selected. Again, the report does not count the days and procedures to bring the product itself
to market; instead the precise outcome measured is the moment when "a firm involved in industrial or
commercial activity" may "begin operating legally." In counting procedures, only procedures that are
required of all businesses are counted, excluding industry-specific regulations.
43. World Bank Group Press Release, supra note 42.
44. The Ministry of Communication of Morocco, Corporate Legal System, at
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/investodi/igbook/4/1.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005); Info-Prod
Research (Middle East) Ltd., Info-Prod Country Guide: Morocco, at http://www.infoprod.co.il/country/-
morocc2b.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
45. Info-Prod Research (Middle East) Ltd., Saudi Arabia, at http://www.infoprod.co.il/-
article/24 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
46. Info-Prod Research (Middle East) Ltd., Info-Prod Country Guide: Jordan, at
http://www.infoprod.co.il/country/jordan2b.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
47. Info-Prod Research (Middle East) Ltd., Info-Prod Country Guide: Oman, at
http://www.infoprod.co.il/country/oman2b.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
48. Some countries in the European Union have a (relatively paltry) minimum capital
requirement of C25,000. See Enriques & Macey, supra note 15, at 1175-76. However, since under a
series of rulings by the European courts it is possible to organize a shell company in an EU member
state with little or no minimum capital requirement, and then organize a "branch" in a member state with
a high minimum capital requirement, these requirements can be avoided easily and cheaply. See, e.g.,
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459 (1999). This is not
the case in the Middle East.
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businesses in rich countries.", 49 Similarly, the report found that relatively
growth-minded Jordan reduced the time it takes to register a new business by
nearly nine weeks and now gives regulators an incentive to maximize the
value recovered for creditors when a business must close. Such reductions are
only relative, however: the Jordanian government still requires a new business
to have minimum capital equivalent to eleven times the nation's average per
capita income. In Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the minimum capital requirement
is more than fifteen times the average income. In Syria, the requirement is a
stunning fifty times the average income. By comparison, more than forty
nations worldwide, including the United States, have no minimum capital
requirement for a start-up business.50
Despite the fact that Jordan's King Abdullah II claims to be strongly in
favor of market-oriented economic liberalization and is ostensibly pursuing
privatization schemes and pro-investment reforms, our critique of inefficient
small-business regulatory regimes remains relevant to Jordan.51 Part of this
disjuncture between words and action may be attributable to the fact that
economic liberalization is often focused on external investors and
multinational corporations rather than on the small businesses that are likely
to be organized by local entrepreneurs. This external focus, in turn, may be
due to the fact that, for the reasons developed in this paper, the incumbent
ruler prefers that the economic gains associated with market reforms inure to
foreigners rather than to domestic entrepreneurs. Any new entrepreneurial
class created by market reforms is likely to push for democratic liberalization
and other changes threatening to incumbent rulers.
In October 2002, King Abdullah II unveiled a high-profile publicity and
public relations campaign called the Jordan First program.52 Structured as a
sort of compact between the government and its people, the program features
government promises to abide by the principles of accountability and
transparency; in turn, it asks Jordanian citizens to place "Jordan's national
interest at the forefront of all considerations of civil society." 53 As for
economic development, the Jordan First campaign features a government
pledge to enact procedural, legislative, and administrative reforms to
"stimulate and encourage private investment in the various economic
facilities." In return, it hopes that the private sector will "plac[e] the
Homeland's interests among its priorities"; such national "interests" include
49. World Bank Group Press Release, supra note 42.
50. See DOING BUSINESS IN 2005, supra note 36, at 89-97.
51. Jordan's indicators in the Doing Business report are abysmal. It takes entrepreneurs eleven
steps and thirty-six days to launch a business, as compared to an OECD average of six steps and twenty-
five days. Furthermore, the cost of starting a business is equal to 53% of gross national income (GNI), as
compared to the 8% average for OECD nations. The most staggering figure, however, may be the ratio
of minimum capitalization requirements to GNI per capita. Jordanian businesses must deposit at least
1147.7% of GNI per capita to receive a business registration number, as compared to a mere 44.1% for
OECD nations. World Bank & Int'l Fin. Corp., Snapshot of Business Environment-Jordan, at
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/ExploreEconomies/BusinessClimateSnapshot.aspx?-
economyid=99 (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
52. Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Economic Reforms, at
http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/erl.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
53. Id.
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private sector investment in education and job training, as well as hiring
preferences for Jordanians.
54
The Jordan First program's objectives are to help build a free,
democratic Jordan that is still Hashemite. The campaign involves the
articulation of the government's self-imposed obligations to various sectors of
society-the private sector, the media, and educational institutions, among
others-and the reciprocal actions that the state suggests these sectors take. A
central goal of the campaign is to engender feelings of nationalism and
patriotism in Jordanian citizens. The state, for example, pledges to provide
citizens with "justice, equality, the Rule of Law, transparency and
accountability." In turn, the people are "duty-bound to respecting its laws and
dignity, safeguarding its constants, protecting its stability and national
security, and defending its interests faithfully and with dedication."
55
The World Bank also reported that, around the world, rich countries
undertook three times as many investment climate reforms as poor countries
during 2004. None of the top ten reformers (Slovakia, Colombia, Belgium,
Finland, India, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) was from the
Middle East.
Other findings related to Middle Eastern nations include:
* Of the fifty-eight countries that reformed business regulation or
strengthened the protection of property rights in the last year, only seven
were in the Middle East.
" Only two nations in the region, Tunisia and Israel, ranked in the top
quartile of the countries surveyed on the ease of doing business. Both
countries improved further last year. Tunisia raised the recovery rate in
bankruptcy and increased the coverage of borrowers in its public credit
registry. Israel established a new procedure for debt recovery in the
courts, which takes less than seven months. Previously, it took a year for
creditors to collect overdue debt.
" Among nations enacting reforms, Jordan improved the process for
starting a new business the most, by cutting the number of procedures
from fourteen to eleven and the number of days from ninety-eight to
thirty-six.
" Jordan, along with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria,
still occupies a place on the list of the ten countries in the world with the
highest minimum capital requirement for starting a business.
" Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen also recently reduced the number of days
necessary to start a business. Saudi Arabia reformed its public credit
registry, nearly doubling the number of borrowers with information
available at the registry.
5
Despite these reforms, Michael Klein, World Bank/IFC vice president for
private sector development and IFC chief economist, observed that "poor
countries that desperately need new enterprises and jobs risk falling even
54. Id.
55. King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan First, at
http://www.kingabdullah.jo/main.php?mainpage=l&lang_hmkal=l (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
56. World Bank Group Press Release, supra note 42.
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further behind rich ones who are simplifying regulation and making their
investment climate more business friendly." 57 The main research findings of
Doing Business in 2005 relevant here are summarized as follows:
* Businesses in poor countries face larger regulatory burdens than those
in rich countries. Poor countries impose higher costs on businesses to
fire a worker, enforce contracts, or file for registration; they impose
more delays in going through insolvency procedures, registering
property, and starting a business; and they afford fewer protections in
terms of legal rights for borrowers and lenders, contract enforcement,
and disclosure requirements. In administrative costs alone, there is a
threefold difference between poor and rich nations. The number of
administrative procedures and the delays associated with them are twice
as high in poor countries.
* Thepayoffsfrom reform appear to be large. The report estimates that an
improvement from the bottom to the top quartile of countries in the ease
of doing business is associated with an additional 2.2% in annual
58economic growth. An indication of the payoff comes from Turkey and
France, each of which saw new business registration increase by 18%
after the governments reduced the time and cost of starting a business
last year. Slovakia's reform of collateral regulation helped increase the
flow of bank loans to the private sector by 10%. The payoff comes
because businesses waste less time and money on unnecessary
regulation and devote more resources to producing and marketing their
goods; there is also a benefit when governments spend less on
ineffective regulation and more on social services.
* Heavy regulation excludes the poor-especially women and younger
people-from doing business. The report finds that weak property rights
and heavy business regulation conspire to exclude the poor from joining
the formal economy. "Heavy regulation not only fails to protect women,
young people, and the poor-those it was intended to serve-but often
harms them," said Caralee McLiesh, one of the report's authors. Doing
Business in 2005 shows that countries with simpler regulations can
provide better social protections and a better economic climate for
businesspeople, investors, and the general public. The report builds on
noted economist Hernando de Soto's work, showing that while it is
critical to encourage registration of assets, it is as important-and more
difficult-to stop them from slipping back into the informal sector.59
What is striking about the reforms aimed at streamlining regulation and
facilitating the process of starting small businesses is that they are so
amazingly simple to implement. It does not take a sophisticated understanding
of economics, finance, or administrative procedure to organize a simple
57. Press Release, The World Bank Group, Doing Business in 2005: Recent EU Entrants Are
Top Reformers While Others in the Region Struggle to Reduce Red Tape for Business, Miss Large
Growth Opportunities, at http://www.worldbank.org.yu/WBSITE/EXTERNALUCOUNTRIES/-
ECAEXT/SERBIAEXTN/O,,contentMDK:20252027-menuPK:300923-pagePK: 141137-piPK: 141127-
theSitePK:300904,00.html (Sept. 8, 2004).
58. But as mentioned above, it is difficult to determine whether the growth helped spur
movement for deregulation.
59. See WORLD BANK, DOING BusNEss IN 2005, supra note 36, at 3-4.
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corporate code or to reduce the costs, both direct and bureaucratic, associated
with starting a business. Therefore, one must consider the possibility that
growth is not encouraged in Middle Eastern countries because the elites in
these countries do not want such growth to occur for political reasons. As
Enrico Colombatto and Jonathan Macey have pointed out previously:
Growth alters the balance of power between the rulers and potential rival coalitions and
increases the probability of political change. In other words, in these economies growth
can bring the political information and transaction costs associated with opposing an
existing ruler into reach. When these costs become affordable [internal] interest groups
that are powerful enough to fight for [regime change] will form. Hence the frequently
observed efforts by [ruling elites] to stifle growth opportunities are consistent with the
rational self-interest of such leaders.60
In other words, low growth exists in certain countries because it is
difficult to displace existing rulers, and existing rulers, of course, have an
interest in keeping it difficult to displace them. One way that those in power
can reduce the likelihood of their displacement is by preventing potential
rivals from amassing enough wealth to pose an effective democratic
challenge. By contrast, in developed countries, which tend to be democratic,
low growth rates tend to make changes in power more likely. In democracies,
low economic and political transaction costs encourage interest groups to
come together to demand change. As growth slows, these groups will become
increasingly successful at advocating for reform. But democracy, tolerance for
dissent, and a minimum level of wealth and security are prerequisites for
groups to demand reform successfully. Often, incumbent rulers in developing
countries have no incentives to press for even the simplest reforms that would
lead to improvements in economic performance, because these reforms would
promote political dissent by providing some of the prerequisites necessary for
groups to galvanize into effective political coalitions. In other words, high
growth is in the interest of the leaders of democracies, but not necessarily
desired by the leaders of non-democracies, where growth will lead to greater
pressures for reform and increased contestability of leadership positions.
Here our argument is consistent with the point made by Noah Feldman
that the "optimal strategy" for autocrats in the Muslim world is "to eliminate
secular democratic dissent, keeping just enough Islamist opposition alive to
make Islamism the only alternative without enabling it to become strong
enough to overthrow the government. ' 61 Autocrats have incentives to keep
enough Islamist extremist opposition alive to permit them to make a credible
(though false) claim that Islamism is the only alternative to the status quo. It
also is important to such autocrats that no group becomes "strong enough to
overthrow the government."
62
60. Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, Information and Transaction Costs as the
Determinants of Tolerable Growth Levels, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 617, 622
(1999) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN REGIME ETLA REVOLUTION GALLIMARD (1985);
Mancur Olson, Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, 23 J. ECON. HIST. 529 (1963)).
61. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY
23 (2003).
62. Id.
Symposium: Nation-Building in the Middle East
Autocrats have the same incentives to stifle the emergence of a middle
class of small-business entrepreneurs as they have to repress Islamic
opposition parties: they do not want serious opposition to their power to
emerge. This motivation appears to be the best rational-choice explanation for
the regulations observed in autocratic Middle Eastern countries, which make
business formation so difficult.
63
We are not claiming that the contestability of democracy is somehow a
prerequisite to having responsive rulers who would be willing to shelve anti-
growth business law. The pro-growth, pro-limited liability stance of China,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Suharto's Indonesia, among others, suggests
otherwise. Our point is that democratic countries inevitably and ubiquitously
feel pressure to grow. It also is the case, however, that non-democratic
countries sometimes feel similar pressures.
Our claim, therefore, is that democracy is a sufficient condition for
inducing responsive rulers to avoid anti-growth policies (such as those
restricting the creation of limited liability business forms). In non-
democracies, the leaders will have to balance the personal benefits of growth
against its costs. Rulers who face other threats to their continued power-
especially external threats-may still find it worthwhile to encourage the
growth of corporate forms of organization and the entrepreneurship that goes
along with them.
64
Promoting entrepreneurship brings both risks and rewards to incumbent
leaders. The rewards come in the form of greater wealth, since the proceeds
from taxation and other forms of revenue collection increase as national
income rises. 65 The risks derive from the fact that, as many studies show,
when incomes rise, governments tend to become more democratic. 66 Clearly,
countries with more economic freedom (lower taxes and less market
regulation) have greater wealth and higher rates of growth. There is a
statistically significant positive relationship between economic freedom and
per capita national income.67 Economic freedom today leads to greater wealth
tomorrow. More interestingy, economic freedom may in some way lead to or
"cause" political freedom.68In turn, this newly acquired political freedom
69poses risks to incumbent leaders.
63. Rational choice theory posits that humans are purposive and goal-oriented. They have sets
of hierarchically ordered preferences, or utilities, and tend to make rational calculations about the utility
of alternative lines of conduct with reference to the preference hierarchy, particularly with respect to
major decisions, such as whether to support policies that would facilitate the creation of small business.
The theory also predicts that social phenomena-social structures, collective decisions, and collective
behavior-are ultimately the result of rational choices made by utility-maximizing individuals.
JONATHAN TURNER, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 354 (1974).
64. Colombatto & Macey, supra note 60, at 637.
65. It might seem that a state may profit more from selling the rights to (or taxing) state-
created monopolies. But this is not the case. Competition increases potential tax revenues both because
there will be higher national income and because competitive prices leave more room for state taxation.
66. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Niclas Berggren, Economic Consequences of Constitutions: A
Theory and Survey, 14 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 3 (2004).
67. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 21; see also W. Ken Farr et al., Economic Freedom, Political Freedom and
Economic Well-Being: A Causality Analysis, 18 CATO J. 247 (1998).
69. See Kurrild-Klitgaard & Berggren, supra note 66, at 19-22; FELDMAN, supra note 61, at
23 (arguing that the optimal strategy for autocrats in the Middle East is to eliminate democratic dissent).
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The natural endowments of particular nations also play an important role
in the extent to which leaders feel pressure to assume the risks and rewards
associated with promoting entrepreneurship. Oddly, states with greater natural
resource wealth-including oil wealth-tend to grow more slowly than their
less well-endowed counterparts. 70 Part of the explanation lies in the fact that
rentier states-which obtain a large proportion of their revenues from external
sources (rents), for example from the sale of natural resources such as oil
7 1-
suffer from a democracy deficit that stifles demand for economic growth. It is
not obvious why being a rentier state undermines democracy: the argument
seems to be that when governments can generate significant wealth from
natural resources, they can reduce the tax burden on their citizens, who in turn
72
demand less from government. Along these lines, states such as Libya and
Saudi Arabia use their oil wealth for social spending programs that have
helped reduce internal pressures for social reform and democratization.73
As discussed below, this paper's analysis is not inconsistent with the
rentier state hypothesis. In fact, the lack of incentives associated with oil
wealth can further reduce rulers' motivations to institute economic reforms.
The problem with the rentier state hypothesis as a global explanation for the
legal and bureaucratic obstacles to business development observed in the
Middle East is that this explanation applies only to states that derive a major
portion of their income from oil and other natural resources. In contrast, the
phenomenon that this paper observes-the imposition of obstacles to
economic growth in the form of regulations making business formation more
difficult-is ubiquitous in the Middle East. It is not limited to rentier states
such as Saudi Arabia but also applies to relatively oil-poor states such as
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
Oil correlates with other problems as well-problems that are not
accounted for by the rentier state hypothesis. In particular, scholars have
observed that states with natural resource wealth tend to have more civil
wars. 74 This phenomenon makes sense: natural resources are worth fighting
70. See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource
Booms and Economic Growth, 59 J. ECON. DEV. 43 (1999); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner,
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth (1995) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 5398), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5398.v5.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
71. The concept of a rentier state can be traced at least to Lenin, who opined that "[tihe rentier
state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the
socio-political conditions of the countries concerned." Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism, in THE LENIN ANTHOLOGY 204, 253 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1975). Hazem Beblawi has
defined the rentier state as one in which the state derives income directly from foreign sources, rather
than from taxes imposed on resident individuals and business firms, and in which "only a few [people]
are engaged in the generation of this rent [income], the majority being only involved in the distribution
or utilization of it." Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in THE RENTIER STATE 49, 51
(Hazem Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani eds., 1987). See also Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325 (2001), available at http:llwww.polisci.ucla.edu/facultyl-
ross/doesoil.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
72. See Giacomo Luciani, Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in THE
RENI-ER STATE, supra note 71, at 63, 73-74.
73. See generally DIRK VANDEWALLE, LIBYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: OIL AND STATE-
BUILDING (1998); John Enteelis, Oil Wealth and the Prospects for Democratization in the Arabian
Peninsula: The Case of Saudi Arabia, in ARAB OIL: IMPACT ON THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL
IMPLICATIONS 77 (Naiem A. Sherbiny & Mark A. Tesler eds., 1976).
74. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffier, On Economic Causes of Civil War, 50 OXFORD ECON.
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over, and coalitions that control a country will control its natural resources.
While incumbent leaders cannot, as a practical matter, rid themselves of
natural resources such as oil in order to reduce the chances of civil war, rulers
can stifle entrepreneurship, thereby reducing societal wealth and hampering
the growth of an educated middle class that might attempt to gain control of
government, or at least pressure the incumbent leadership for democratic
reforms. Of course, as the threat of civil war increases, incumbent leaders can
justify repressive, anti-democratic measures, as well as the care and feeding of
a large police state capable of quashing both violent unrest and democratic
initiatives.
The insights in this paper have implications that complement the rentier
state hypothesis regarding the issue of whether oil and other natural resources
hinder democracy. 5 In the framework developed here, every ruling coalition
faces a tradeoff between the benefits of economic liberalization-including,
most significantly, higher tax revenues-and the costs, primarily the
emergence of a middle class of small-business entrepreneurs.
Assuming, as is probably the case, a diminishing marginal utility of
wealth for despots, countries with oil see (ceteris paribus) fewer benefits from
liberalization (because they have oil wealth), but no fewer costs. Therefore,
non-democratic countries with oil wealth will be even less inclined to engage
in liberalization than other non-democratic countries. Michael Ross has made
a related argument, hypothesizing that "[w]hen oil revenues provide a
government with enough money, the government will use its largesse to
prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and
hence that may be inclined to demand political rights. 76 Similarly, Kiren Aziz
Chaudhry has argued that governments in the Middle East "deliberately
destroyed independent civil institutions" and developed programs that were
"explicitly designed to depoliticize the population. ' 77
Small-business formation produces problems for government in much
the same way as oil. Both generate revenues and both generate social unrest.
Whether Middle Eastern states use their oil revenues deliberately to inhibit
dissent may be subject to some disagreement, 78 but the impediments to small-
business formation are unambiguously deliberate.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, countries in the Middle East can
be divided into three categories: poorly endowed states with clear external
PAPERS 563 (1998); Indra de Soysa, The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or
Paucity?, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 113 (Mats Berdal & David
M. Malone eds., 2000).
75. Ross, supra note 71.
76. Id. at 334.
77. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State, 27
COMP. POL. 1, 19 (1994). Country studies on Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf states have argued
that oil wealth has been an impediment to democracy by retarding the formation of social capital. See,
e.g., Jill Crystal, Civil Society in the Arab Gulf States, in 2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 259
(Augustus Richard Norton ed., 1996); John P. Entellis, Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation
in Algerian Politics, in 2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 45; Zuhair Humadi, Civil Society
Under the Ba'th in Iraq, in TOWARD CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 50 (Jillian Schwedler ed.,
1995); Farhad Kazemi, Civil Society and Iranian Politics, in 2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
supra, at 119.
78. Ross, supra note 69, at 334.
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threats (e.g., Israel and Lebanon); poorly endowed states with no clear
external threats (e.g., Syria and Egypt); and, finally, oil-rich states (e.g.,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). 9
We predict that poorly endowed states with clear external threats will be
forced to pursue liberal economic policies that encourage growth and
development. The leaders of countries such as Israel and Lebanon (and
Singapore and Taiwan outside of the Middle East) must, if they are to survive,
produce growth in order to generate the resources necessary to provide
security against external threat, and to quell internal dissatisfaction.80 In other
words, the presence of an external threat makes leadership positions in these
countries contestable, as in democracies. This contestability, in turn, leads to
responsive government. Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in Israel,
which would cease to exist if it could no longer generate the resources
necessary to provide for strong national defense. Moreover, a weaker
economy, as measured by lower GDP per capita, would make it more difficult
for Israel to attract Jewish immigration and to prevent emigration to richer
countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Thus, despite the
hard socialist underpinnings of the Jewish state, successive governments,
although nominally left-wing, have pursued pro-growth economic policies.
In contrast, the ruling coalitions in Syria and Egypt, with few external
threats, have weak incentives to pursue reforms likely to generate growth, and
are even more weakly inclined to tolerate the political dissent and the
democratically inclined social class that such growth is likely to generate.
Consistent with our analysis, while it is relatively cheap and simple to start a
new business in Lebanon and Israel, it is costly and complex to do so in Egypt
and Syria.
Of course, this argument does not imply that Egypt and Syria are free
from pressure for political reform, despite the lack of democratic government.
As a result of the recent U.S.-sponsored elections in Iraq, the entire Middle
East is "bubbling with expectations for political reform." 81 The pressure
comes both from domestic opposition groups and from foreign governments.
The pressure on Egypt is particularly strong, since the country receives
roughly $2 billion in U.S. aid annually and has been criticized for moving too
slowly to enact democratic reforms. In particular, during his State of the
Union address on February 2, 2005, President George W. Bush suggested that
"[t]he great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace
79. Oil-rich states can afford larger military forces to arm themselves against both external
threats and internal pressure. Oil-rich states also are likely to enjoy the protection of the U.S. security
umbrella. This is the case with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whose ruling coalitions enjoy the benefits of a
significant U.S. military presence, without which they probably would not survive for very long.
80. While control of Lebanon's government clearly is not as contestable as it might be, due to
the presence of Syrian "peace-keepers" and the installation of a pro-Syrian puppet government, relative
to other Middle Eastern countries, Lebanon has strong democratic traditions and impulses. For example,
on February 28, 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karami announced the resignation of his pro-
Syrian government. The resignation occurred two weeks after the assassination of Karami's predecessor,
Rafik Hariri, which triggered protests in the streets and demands that Syria withdraw its troops from the
country. See Hassan M. Fattah, Syria Under Pressure: Worse Trouble May Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
3, 2005, at A3.
81. Neil MacFarquhar, Mubarak Pushes Egypt To Allow Freer Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2005, at Al.
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in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle
East." 82 Shortly thereafter, on February 26, Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak unexpectedly called on his country's parliament to amend the
Constitution to allow for direct, multiparty presidential elections for the first
time in the nation's history. 83 President Mubarak predicted that the next
president of Egypt "will be elected through direct, secret balloting, opening
the opportunity for political parties to run in the presidential elections and
providing guarantees that allow more than one candidate for the people to
choose from with their own will."' 84 The press heralded the proposal as
responding both to "vocal domestic demands for increased democracy as well
as stepped-up pressure from the Bush administration.'
85
On a more modest note, bowing to international pressure, Syria has said
that it will remove its troops from Lebanon.8 6 Furthermore, Syria recently
arrested and turned over to Iraqi officials some thirty former leaders of
Saddam Hussein's regime who were being sought by U.S. coalition forces for
aiding the insurgency in Iraq. Hussein's half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-
Hassan al-Tikriti, the former chief of Iraq's two most powerful security
agencies, was among this group.8
7
Our hypothesis is that democratization will bring with it internal
pressure for economic reform. We also posit that economic reform will bring
increased pressure for democratization in countries such as Egypt and Syria.
For this reason, economic reform of the kind discussed in this paper
(simplifying and reducing the costs of business formation) will be a leading
indicator of political leaders' real interest in implementing meaningful
democratic reforms that go beyond mere public relations gimmicks.
Finally, countries in the third category, such as Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, have even weaker incentives to pursue high-growth economic policies
than do resource-poor countries such as Egypt and Syria, since their natural
resources provide them with the wealth necessary to pacify local dissent and
to attract the protection of the U.S. military. In these countries starting a new
business is costly and complex. Moreover, as we would expect, the situation is
82. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address Before a Joint Session of Congress
(Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html.
83. MacFarquhar, supra note 81.
84. Id.
85. Id. During his speech, President Mubarak did not discuss amending Article 77 of the
Egyptian Constitution, which provides for an unlimited term of office for the Egyptian president. His
comments were restricted to amending Article 76 of the Constitution, which deals with how presidents
are selected. Not all observers were convinced that the proposed changes were meaningful. Id.
Columnist and political analyst Ibrahim Eissa argued that:
This is a way [for Mubarak] to improve his image with the Americans and to please them
with some formal changes .... [w]hile at the same time he is keeping everything else
unchanged, like the emergency laws, imprisoning the opposition, the state controlling the
media and political parties existing just on paper. This is deception.
Id. at A4. Ayman Nour, head of Al Ghad, a newly approved political party, was imprisoned on January
29, 2005, on allegations that he forged signatures to gain government recognition of his political party.
Critics of Mubarak such as Hisham Qassim, Vice President of Al Ghad, contend that "the only credible
candidate against Mubarak is lying in prison on trumped up charges." Id. at A4.
86. Dexter Filkins, Syrians Promise To Quit Lebanon by Month's End, U.N. Envoy Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, at Al.
87. John F. Bums, Syria Turns Over a Top Insurgent, Iraqis Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005,
at Al.
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worse in Saudi Arabia than it is in Kuwait, because the latter is more
vulnerable to external threats.
Another concern for the leaders of non-democracies might involve the
management of inequality. While we have stressed the direct threat that an
emergent middle class poses for incumbent rulers, it is also possible that a
newly minted, discrete entrepreneurial class would provoke lower-class
resentment and thus indirectly threaten to destabilize an incumbent regime.
s8
Lower-class resentment would reinforce the impulse for incumbents to oppose
growth policies---especially if the masses resent royalty and old wealth less
than new wealth.89
It must be stressed that the present discussion, which concerns the
optimal strategy of rulers in an autocracy, need not make the strong claim that
the ruling elite is in fact rational. We need only sustain the significantly
weaker claim that these rulers behave as though they were rational. 90 This
claim seems quite easy to make because natural selection among competing
rulers will disfavor autocrats who act irrationally (i.e., in ways inconsistent
with the goal of remaining in power) and favor leaders who, whether rational
or not, act rationally in a pattern consistent with the objective of remaining in
power. Nevertheless, in light of the high stakes that characterize the context
we consider here-whether national leaders will adopt rational strategies
when their very survival is at stake-the assumption that leaders will carefully
consider the consequences of their actions and behave in accordance with the
policy of maximizing the probability that they will remain in power-seems
hardly far-fetched or unrealistic.
Our analysis is also consistent with public choice theory, which applies
the assumptions of microeconomics to the realm of government behavior.
Although self-interested behavior leads to desirable results in the sphere of
private ordering, such behavior also dominates the sphere of public ordering,
where it produces political decisions designed to benefit the decision-makers,
often with negative consequences for those subject to such decisions. Interest
groups and ruling coalitions (and voters in democracies) seek special
advantages from the state in a process known as rent-seeking.
Public choice theory applies to bureaucrats as well as to the politicians
and autocrats they serve. Indeed, for some thinkers, public sector bureaucrats
are the critical agents in public choice theory. While such bureaucrats often,
and erroneously, are assumed to work in the public interest by effectuating
rational, public-spirited government programs efficiently and effectively,
public choice theorists see bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers,
motivated by such factors as "salary, perquisites of the office, public
reputation, power, patronage... and ease of managing the bureau."
91
88. Amy Chua has shown how free-market forces can provoke lower-class resentment against
"market dominant minorities." See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2002).
89. At the 2005 Yale Middle East Legal Studies Seminar, reference was made to Egyptian
President Gamel Abdel Nasser's seduction of the masses with regard to policies that seem to sacrifice
growth in the name of equality.
90. Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 39-43 (1953) (articulating the
rationality assumption in economics in the same manner).
91. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY: SERVANT OR MASTER? 22 (1973).
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From a public choice perspective, increasing the number of procedures
necessary to start a new business makes perfect sense. For every government
permit necessary to start a business, a new bureaucratic structure can be
formed and staffed with the friends and relatives of the autocrat. Thus, a
recent World Bank survey of laws, regulations, and government officials from
around the world found that the largest single problem in starting a new
business was the presence of "[t]oo many separate procedures and different
offices to visit."92 In particular, the World Bank recommends creating single
access points for business, making the electronic registration of new
businesses possible, standardizing paperwork across bureaucracies, and
imposing a "silence is consent" rule in business registrations.93 As sensible as
these suggestions are, it is clear why autocratic regimes are often reluctant to
implement them: the costs associated with effectuating these reforms would
be borne by politically powerful and well-connected bureaucrats, along with
their autocratic sponsors, who would suffer a diminution of power (including,
potentially, the ability to collect bribes and to employ lower-level
bureaucrats). The benefits from such reform, however, would inure only to an
amorphous, attenuated, politically powerless group of nascent entrepreneurs
who might overcome the obstacles to starting a new business if such
transaction costs were reduced.
Consistent with this analysis, it is not surprising that the average number
of days required to start a business in the Middle East (not including Israel) is
forty-three, as compared to eight in France, thirteen in Italy, and five in the
United States, and that more procedures (an average of 10.5) are needed to
start a business in the average Middle Eastern country (not including Israel)
than in the United States (five), Israel (five), France (seven), or even heavilyS 94
bureaucratized Italy (nine).
The public choice analysis explains why so much bureaucracy is
required to start a new business in non-democratic countries in the Muslim
world and elsewhere. The rational choice analysis explains both why so much
bureaucracy is required and why minimum capital requirements are so high.
Both theories focus on the private incentives of a ruling elite, both in self-
preservation and in the expansion of its power base. Next we consider the
extent to which the heavy bureaucracy and high minimum capital
requirements observed, particularly in autocratic states in the Middle East, can
be rationalized as consistent with the public interest. We conclude that they
cannot be so rationalized.
First, with respect to the requirements regarding bureaucracy and the
suggestion that government can assist business by nominating an existing
bureaucracy to be the single access point, bringing together representatives of
various other agencies, we see no other explanation, other than the public
choice and rational choice explanations offered here, for why developing
countries do not streamline their procedures for starting new businesses in
92. DOING BUSINESS IN 2005, supra note 36, at 21. This point originally was made in
HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH 132-34 (1987), a brilliant study of the obstacles to starting a
business in Peru.
93. DOING BUSINESS IN 2005, supra note 36, at 21.
94. See infra tbl. 2.
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order to reduce associated transaction costs. 95 Similarly, other well-known
reforms-particularly eliminating court involvement in the registration
process, permitting companies to utilize a single company identification
number, and allowing a general-objects clause in new firms' articles of
incorporation-are all simple, straightforward policy initiatives with clear
benefits and no discernible costs, other than for bureaucrats.
Somewhat more controversial is our argument that the high minimum
capital rules of various autocratic Middle Eastern countries can be explained
on the grounds that such rules are necessary to protect creditors dealing with
the new firm from losses incurred in extending credit to marginally capitalized
companies. First and foremost, the protections provided by minimum capital
requirements are entirely illusory. These rules are purely barriers to entry:
they do not require that firms maintain a minimum amount of capital to
protect creditors. Thus, a company with $1 million in minimum capital at the
start of operations is free, of course, to allocate this capital to operations. By
the end of the first year (indeed, by the end of the first day) of operations, the
entire value of the original capital contribution might be dissipated.
Second, with respect to contract claimants, the ineluctable reality is that
creditors today do not rely on statutory protection (such as restrictions on
dividend payments and other distributions, or minimum capital requirements).
Trade creditors rely instead on continuous, careful monitoring of their
payments for receivables, while commercial lenders require disclosure of
financial data, security interests, and contractual limitations on distributions.96
These market-based contractual protections have the advantage of being
flexible. Such protections are also superior to minimum capital rules because
they can be tailored to the needs of particular companies and their creditors.
By contrast, minimum capital rules manage to be both over- and under-
inclusive in the creditor protections they provide. Such rules are over-
protective because they require firms with few, if any, creditors and little
risk-firms that pose no danger to prospective creditors-to incur the
economic waste associated with high minimum capital requirements in order
to initiate activity. By contrast, contractual protections are, by their very
nature, tailored to the particular needs of individual companies. Instead,
minimum capital requirements take a one-size-fits-all approach to the issue of
minimum capitalization that necessarily distorts capital markets.
Minimum capital requirements are under-protective of creditors'
interests for the same reason: by imposing uniform capital requirements, they
necessarily do not provide sufficient levels of protection for the creditors of
businesses that are hazardous or simply highly risky. Indeed, if minimum
capital protections were the only protections available to creditors, then the
economy would generate too many risky and too few safe ventures.
There is a slightly stronger argument in favor of minimum capital
requirements as a means of protecting involuntary creditors, such as tort
claimants, as opposed to contractual claimants who make voluntary
95. DOING BUSINESS IN 2005, supra note 36, at 21.
96. See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 98-103 (3d ed. 1990);
Enriques & Macey, supra note 36, at 1188-95.
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investments and can decline to invest, or who can charge a high rate of
interest to compensate for the various sorts of risk inherent in a particular
investment. Even here, however, the public interest argument for imposing
minimum capital requirements on all new limited liability companies is very
weak. First, the rules do not apply only to non-contractual claimants. The fact
that tort claimants and other involuntary creditors do not have a priority over
other claimants suggests that the minimum capital rules are not designed for
their protection. Moreover, for the reasons mentioned above regarding the
illusory nature of minimum capital requirements, requiring insurance would
be a far superior strategy for addressing the needs of involuntary creditors
than the imposition of minimum capital requirements. Yet consistent with the
public and rational choice theories-and inconsistent with the public interest
theory-we do not observe countries imposing the requirement that firms in
risky lines of business purchase liability insurance for the benefit of their
potential tort victims.
The above point about the efficacy of insurance markets as a substitute
for minimum capital requirements is particularly relevant to developing
countries, where the argument might be made that weaknesses in the legal
system, corruption, poor creditor protection, and other factors make minimum
capital requirements the best option in a less-than-perfect world, characterized
by an acute lack of accounting and appraisal services as well as by weak
enforcement of contractual terms due to corruption or incompetence in the
courts. Presumably, such shortcomings will be known to creditors, who can
price that risk. Moreover, minimum capital requirements do not help creditors
in countries where weak enforcement is an obstacle to recovery.
C. Anti-Americanism as Pretext
The benefits of the limited liability form of business organization are so
well known by now that, in addition to explaining the failure of Middle
Eastern countries to invent modern forms of business organization through
their own internal economic development processes, it also seems necessary
to explain why such countries took so long even to mimic successful forms of
business organization. Middle Eastern states have been in constant contact
with the outside world over the relevant period-from the sixteenth century,
when joint stock companies were introduced, to the modern corporation,
beginning with the Dutch and East India Companies that emerged in the
seventeenth century, until about 1850, when the first corporation emerged in
the Middle East.97
This observation of course raises the question of why Middle Eastern
countries did not adopt or borrow some sort of corporate organizational form
from the West, since it was obvious that this form of business organization
was an extremely efficient way to organize an economic system. The
preceding Section suggested that ruling elites may have felt threatened by the
introduction of the corporate organizational form. In addition, massive anti-
American sentiment in the Muslim world may explain the reluctance to adopt
97. See supra notes 20& 39 and accompanying text.
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a form of doing business so closely aligned with the West in general, and with
the United States in particular, at least over the past fifty years or so, a period
during which an intellectual consensus emerged about the economic
advantages of private ordering (particularly with respect to capital formation),
limited liability for investors, and the contractual theory of the corporation in
general.
Survey data show that more than 70% of the people in most Middle
Eastern countries have an unfavorable view of the United States, and
stunningly, only 1% of people surveyed in Jordan and Palestine in 2003 held a
favorable opinion of the United States. 98 The same researchers found that in
Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and the Palestine Authority, Osama Bin
Laden was among the top three "most trusted" leaders.
99
While misinformation appears to be rampant in the Middle East (78% of
respondents in seven Muslim countries said they did not believe that the
people responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon were Arabs), it probably is not much more rampant
there than it is here in the United States (69% of Americans believe it is likely
that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the attacks),3° The problem
is that the two sorts of misinformation have one thing in common: the
misinformation is used in ways that impose costs on countries, and people, in
the Middle East itself. The misinformation about Saddam Hussein, of course,
was used to justify the U.S.-led coalition's most recent invasion of Iraq, which
led to the overthrow of Saddam's regime and the eventual capture of the Iraqi
leader.
The unfavorable views of the United States and the West in general
among Middle Easterners inevitably contribute to their systematic reluctance
to copy what are erroneously viewed as exclusively Western economic
philosophies and approaches. Interestingly, the two countries outside the
United States that have been the most successful in fostering domestic venture
capital practices are Taiwan and Israel. In both states, active involvement in
fostering the venture capital industry occurred only after the private sector had
begun, on its own initiative, to follow the U.S. template. Also, and highly
significantly, unlike the United States, both Taiwan and Israel had bank-
centered rather than stock market-centered financial systems, although
"synchronically with the development of the venture capital industry," the
financial system transformed itself and the capital markets began to displace
the bankinl system as the focal point for capital allocation decisions in the
economy.
The point is not that other countries must align themselves with, or even
enter, the U.S. foreign policy orbit in order to be successful. No such
alignment is either a necessary or a sufficient precondition for growth. Rather,
98. THE PEW RESEARCH CR. FOR THE PEOPLE, VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD 19 (2003).
99. Id. at3.
100. Washington Post Poll: Saddam Hussein and the Sept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data82303.htm (Sept. 6,2003).
101. Rafiq Dossani & Martin Kenney, Creating an Environment: Developing Venture Capital
in India 14 (June 6, 2002) (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Econ. Working Paper No. 143), http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/12010/DossaniKenney.pdf.
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to the extent that antipathy toward the United States collapses into an
unwillingness to mimic Western institutions and organizational forms, that
antipathy will lead to a reduction in growth prospects. Successful
organizational forms and institutions developed in the United States and
elsewhere should be imported and used as templates by developing countries
in the Middle East and the rest of the developing world.
Freer access to modem variants on the basic corporate form can be
introduced, as it has been recently in China, Italy, and Taiwan, without the
sacrifice of ethnic or cultural individuality. Similarly, the red tape and
bureaucracy that impede the utilization of such forms can be reduced or
eliminated without the sacrifice of national autonomy. Those who oppose
reform in the guise of opposing Westernization are pursuing their own selfish
political agenda; they are not really working to preserve important historical,
cultural, or religious institutions because it is not necessary to sacrifice such
institutions in order to achieve growth.
III. CONCLUSION
Accomplishing the elusive goal of promoting economic growth requires
a modest but resolute effort by the government. State action must provide the
legal institutions that private sector actors require before entrepreneurial
activity can begin in earnest. In particular, government must supply the legal
framework for investing in order to give entrepreneurs and capital market
participants the incentives necessary to provide not only the money but also,
more importantly, the human capital required to jump-start the economy by
starting small businesses.
This task is not difficult. Governments have a number of tested and
highly functional templates already in use by other economies around the
world from which to choose. The problem faced by policy planners and
reformers is not, therefore, a technological one: the designs of successful
business organizations are already in place. The challenge, rather, is a political
one. An entirely predictable consequence of establishing the legal framework
for a vibrant business sector is the emergence of a politically engaged middle
class that might well pose serious challenges for the incumbent governmental
elite. A similar problem is posed by the fact that making it easier to form new
businesses will dramatically reduce the power of the extant bureaucracies,
which raises the costs and the time necessary to start new small enterprises in
the Middle East.
We recognize, of course, that it is difficult to disentangle the multiplicity
of competing explanations for the seemingly perennial problem of
underdevelopment in the Middle East. Our theory adds to the existing
literature on law, finance, and development, particularly that of LLSV, by
relaxing the implausible assumption that incumbent leaders of
underperforming economies are doing everything they can to promote growth.
We point to a simple fix-making incorporation easier-that is not even being
attempted in many places. Arguments that lack of reform in this area can be
explained by history, religion, culture, or other path-dependent rationales are
highly implausible in light of the fact that institutional reform in this area
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would be not only straightforward and simple from a technological
perspective but also non-controversial and unchallenging from a religious and
cultural perspective. The ultimate challenge for government is not in
providing the legal architecture necessary for economic growth. Technically
speaking, the task of providing the relevant legal infrastructure for the
corporate form and allowing free and rapid access to it is quite simple. The
challenge, rather, is for government to impose upon itself the self-restraint
necessary to limit its own power over business. It is to this task that
international institutions such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development should devote their development efforts.
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Table 1.













Saudi Arabia 22,000,000 $8,530
Syria 17,000,000 $1,160
Tunisia 10,000,000 $2,240
United Arab Emirates 4,000,000 $20,217
Gaza 1,300,000 $600
West Bank 2,300,000 $800
Yemen 19,000,000 $600
Middle East and North Africa 313,000,000 $2,532
(excluding Israel)
United States 288,000,000 $37,610
Table 2.
Country Name # Days to # of Cost of Starting Minimum Capital Minimum
Start a Procedures a Business Requirements Capital
Business to Start a (3/ of income (% of income Requirements
Business per capita) per capita) U.S.$
Algeria 26 14 27.3 65.5 $1,237.95
Egypt 43 13 63 815.6 $11,336.84
France 8 7 1.1 0 $0
Germany 45 9 5.9 48.8 $12,322.00
Iran 48 9 7.3 2.1 $42.00
Israel 34 5 5.5 0 $0
Italy 13 9 16.2 11.2 $2,414.72
Jordan 36 11 49.8 1147.7 $21,219.5
Kuwait 35 13 2.4 148.5 $24,264.90
Lebanon 46 6 131.5 82.3 $3,324.00
Morocco 11 5 12.3 718.6 $9,485.52
Nigeria 44 10 95.2 59.4 $190.08
Oman 34 9 4.9 100.1 $7908.3
Saudi Arabia 64 12 69.7 1549.5 $132,172.35
South Africa 38 9 9.1 0 $0
Syria 47 12 34.2 5053.9 $58,625.24
Tunisia 14 9 11 327.3 $7331.52
United Arab 54 12 26.5 416.9 $84,284.67
Emirates
Yemen 63 12 269.3 1716.9 $8,117.72
Middle East and 43 10.5 58.10 870.27 $26,395.76
North Africa
(excl. Israel)
United States 5 5 0.6 0 $0
Source: WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH

